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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings
using a sample of Korean listed firms and finds a positive relationship in the subse-
quent period after adjusting for absolute efficiency. The results suggest that credit rat-
ing agencies consider relative efficiency as a variable that influences a firm’s ability to
survive a business cycle. Interestingly, when we divide our samples into investment-
grade and non-investment-grade firms, we find a different relationship. While we
continue to find consistent results for the investment-grade group, we find a negative
relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings for non-investment-grade
firms. We suggest “higher” levels of efficiency by non-investment-grade firms can be
considered opportunistic or a form of distress, and potentially be the result of inef-
fective decision making. We conjecture that credit rating agencies have the ability to
impose penalties of lower credit ratings on firms that engage in such behavior.
Keywords: relative efficiency; credit ratings; credit risk; frontier analysis.
Corresponding author: H.-J. Lim Print ISSN 1744-6619 jOnline ISSN 1755-9723
c 2019 Infopro Digital Risk (IP) Limited
1
2 D. Mali and H.-J. Lim
1 INTRODUCTION
The role of a credit rating agency is to provide market participants with information
about whether a firm is likely to survive through a business cycle (Carey and Hrycay
2001). We believe that firms with higher relative efficiency than their peers are more
likely to withstand the stressful macroeconomic conditions that can cause a firm to
default. A firm’s relative efficiency is an estimate of operational performance: higher
operational performance demonstrates that a firm’s management has been effective
in generating the maximum number of sales from given resources. Consequently,
credit rating agencies have the potential to capture management’s effective utiliza-
tion of resources and include this information in a firm’s credit rating. Thus, we
perform empirical tests to evaluate whether relative efficiency can be considered a
key determinant when estimating credit ratings. While we do not explicitly test the
relationship between operational performance (relative efficiency) and effective deci-
sion making (strategic management), we consider there to be an implicit relationship
between the two based on the assumption that management’s ability to make effective
decisions reduces inefficiency. Debtholders, firms and market participants pay close
attention to credit ratings: debtholders depend on credit ratings in order to moni-
tor the security of their investment; firms would prefer to have higher credit ratings
because they are required to pay lower interest yields on debt. Therefore, whether
credit ratings reflect a firm’s overall operational performance (proxied by relative
efficiency) is an important question for market participants.
A firm’s efficiency level is determined by changes in output (salest   salest 1)
divided by changes in input (costst   costst 1). Firms can influence their efficiency
ratio in two different ways: output maximization or input minimization. A firm can
maximize output using a number of techniques, including effective promotional
activities, understanding their markets and market trends, effective pricing strate-
gies, and through the adoption of new technologies. Firms can also improve their
efficiency score by minimizing input levels using a number of different techniques,
for instance, effective utilization of resources, efficient manufacturing and keeping
their labor force at an optimum level. A firm with the ability to effectively implement
such strategies should demonstrate superior operational performance relative to their
peers. We conjecture that efficiency positively influences a firm’s credit rating based
on the belief that rating agencies consider relative efficiency to be a variable that
influences default risk.
A firm’s credit rating is based on a spectrum ranging from AAA to D. How-
ever, regulators, financial institutions and numerous academic studies treat non-
investment-grade (NIG) and investment-grade (IG) firms separately due to their dif-
fering risk structures (Becker and Milbourn 2011; Bolton et al 2012; Opp et al 2013;
Alissa et al 2013; Kraft 2015). We speculate that, given that financial institutions
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consider IG and NIG firms to be different, there may be differences in their business
operations. Compared with NIG firms, IG firms are potentially more likely to have
the ability to optimize efficiency through robust strategic management systems that
keep their operational performance at a higher level. NIG firms may reduce inputs
in order to increase efficiency because they have less ability to raise output (sales).
In this study, we compare the relative efficiency of firms using frontier analysis –
specifically data envelopment analysis (DEA) – to capture the relationships between
efficiency and credit ratings for both groups. We speculate that there are potentially
different phenomenons explaining the relationship between efficiency, operational
performance and credit ratings for both groups. IG firms at the optimum efficiency
frontier should have a strategic management system in place in order to maximize
operational efficiency. NIG firms have the potential to opportunistically minimize
required operational expenses and resources in order to meet financial targets. Conse-
quently, while the latter firms are theoretically closer to the optimal efficiency frontier
horizon, this position could be achieved through opportunistic reductions in required
resources and weak operational performance, or as a result of economic distress.
Our study is motivated by three questions. First, we investigate whether relative
efficiency has explanatory power regarding the relationship between firm efficiency
and credit ratings. Previous literature partitions efficiency studies into two fields
based on two different methodological approaches:
(1) absolute efficiency using financial ratio (eg, asset turnover D sales=total
assets, return on total assets D earnings before interest and taxes/total net
assets (or ROTA D EBIT=TA)); and
(2) relative efficiency studies based on frontier analysis techniques (relative effi-
ciency scores are compared with industry peers of the same period).
Borrowing from the Ohlson (1995) model, studies by Fairfield and Yohn (2001) and
Soliman (2008) demonstrate a positive relationship between efficiency using finan-
cial ratios and firm performance. Absolute-efficiency-based financial ratios, such as
return on assets (ROA), are generally interpreted as a measure of “operating effi-
ciency”. However, critics of the absolute efficiency methodology suggest that the
technique leads to bias. Using frontier analysis, there is evidence suggesting that
firm efficiency has a significant positive influence on firm performance (Alam and
Sickles 1998; Greene and Segal 2004) and that efficiency changes based on frontier
analysis are incrementally informative compared to financial ratios (Baik et al 2012;
Demerjian et al 2012; Frijns et al 2012). Firms can choose numerous different inputs
in order to create outputs. DEA is considered advantageous because it allows dif-
ferential weightings of inputs that are likely to yield a more accurate measurement
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than financial ratios. DEA analysis distinguishes between random shocks and tech-
nical inefficiencies in the production function, while simple financial ratios cannot.
Given the lack of previous studies linking relative efficiency and credit ratings, we
are interested in examining whether there is a statistically significant relationship
between relative efficiency and credit ratings in the subsequent period after adjusting
for absolute efficiency and other key determinants.
Second, we are curious whether credit rating agencies can capture a firm’s rel-
ative efficiency and compound this information with a firm’s credit rating. Third,
we question whether the relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings
is different for investment-grade and non-investment-grade firms. Banks and sup-
pliers use credit ratings when issuing terms for payment, and consider NIG and IG
firms to be fundamentally different. There is evidence to prove that firms would take
action to manage leverage (Kisgen 2009; Hovakimian and Hovakimian 2009) and
earnings (Ali and Zhang 2008; Jung et al 2013) in order to influence a credit rating
agency’s perception of default risk. These strategies are found to be more promi-
nent when firms are closer to the investment-grade threshold (Alissa et al 2013).
These decisions would improve a firm’s efficiency level, but managing leverage and
earnings would lead to weaker operational performance and fail to achieve financial
targets. Thus, we are also motivated by whether it is possible to capture different
relationships between efficiency and credit rating levels for IG and NIG firms.
Using a sample of 14 720 Korea Stock Exchange (KRX) firm–year observations
from 2000 to 2015, our ordered probit regression analysis suggests that relative
efficiency computed from frontier analysis has a statistically significant positive
relationship with credit ratings in the subsequent period, after adjusting for abso-
lute efficiency. The results suggest that relatively more efficient firms are able to
achieve higher credit ratings than less efficient firms. Our results are consistent when
replacing relative efficiency scores with decile ranks. When using an interaction
term for our relative efficiency score and an IG dummy that divides our sample
into investment-grade and non-investment-grade groups, we find evidence suggest-
ing that the relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings is stronger for
investment-grade firms. Overall, the results suggest that relative efficiency has the
explanatory power to illustrate the relationship between firm efficiency and credit
ratings in the subsequent period.
Next, we partition our sample into IG and NIG samples and repeat the analysis.
While we find a consistent positive relationship when using the IG sample, we find
a negative relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings for NIG firms,
suggesting that firm efficiency negatively influences credit ratings for the NIG group.
Our interpretation of this result is that the high efficiency achieved by NIG firms has
the potential to be influenced by opportunistic managerial decisions and is not a
reflection of true efficiency levels. It is possible that managers of NIG firms may
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have engaged in input-manipulation activities, such as reducing necessary expendi-
ture (eg, advertising, research and development (R&D), workforce), downsizing in
order to increase short-term efficiency. Consequently, this form of efficiency may be
captured and punished by credit rating agencies. Our results are robust with various
forms of additional analysis.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence
that relative efficiency computed using DEA is informative in predicting credit rat-
ings in the subsequent period and provides additional information when included
with absolute efficiency. Second, we find different relationships between firm effi-
ciency and credit ratings for investment-grade and non-investment-grade firms. We
suggest that both groups have potentially different capabilities and incentives that
result in superior or inferior operational performance. NIG firms may demonstrate
efficiency through manipulation of short-term input decisions. We infer from this
that inferior decision making is manifested in a firm’s efficiency ratio and leads to a
credit rating reduction in the subsequent period. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to examine the relationship between relative efficiency and credit rat-
ings and find different relationships between credit ratings and efficiency based on
a firm’s credit rating status. Our results may be of interest to credit rating agencies,
debtholders, shareholders and other market participants who believe the link between
efficiency determined by the decisions of management and credit ratings determined
by agencies is important.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we explain our research
design and variable estimation. In Section 4, we report the results of our empiri-
cal analysis. We include additional analyses for robustness in Section 5. Section 6
provides a summary of our main findings and conclusions.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Literature review on credit ratings
Credit rating agencies provide information to market participants about a firm’s
potential risk of financial default. Ratings analysts base their rating decisions pri-
marily on financial data that includes a comparative assessment of a firm’s finan-
cial strength, leverage, profitability, size and stability (Hovakimian et al 2001; Hov-
akimian and Hovakimian 2009; Kraft 2015). In addition, credit rating agencies ana-
lyze “soft data”, a combination of management quality, internal controls, corporate
governance and industry structure (Moody’s Investor Service 2018). The purpose of
a credit rating is to provide investors, government agencies and stakeholders with an
“economically meaningful” assessment of a firm’s strength relative to its peers (Boot
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Credit Risk
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et al 2006). In South Korea, the four largest credit rating agencies – NICE Group,
Korea Investors Service (KIS), SCI Information Service Inc and Korea Ratings (KR)
– offer an ordinal rank of downside risk consistent with the international credit rat-
ing agencies Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s. Credit ratings are divided into
ten broad categories with increasing levels of risk (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC,
CC, C and D). Each broad category is further grouped by˙ notches. Firms with the
same ordinal rank are considered to have similar levels of credit risk (Kisgen 2006;
Boot et al 2006).
Banks and insurance companies can only hold IG bonds, due to regulatory con-
straints (Becker and Milbourn 2011); credit rating agencies require IG firms to com-
ply with strict rating-contingent regulation (Bolton et al 2012). Several studies con-
sider different levels of risk for investment-grade and non-investment-grade firms
(Opp et al 2013; Kraft 2015). The distinction between IG and NIG is due to differ-
ences in their corporate systems, performance, governance and ability to withstand
economic distress. There are various advantages associated with IG status. NIG firms
that straddle the investment-grade threshold would likely enjoy more favorable fees
from suppliers, more investment, lower rates and reputational advantages. Jung et al
(2013) find that earnings smoothing via earnings management is higher when firms
have the potential to straddle specific thresholds. Ali and Zhang (2008) find evidence
that  notch category firms use higher levels of earnings management than middle
category firms, in order to influence a credit ratings upgrade/downgrade. Further,
Alissa et al (2013) show that earnings management is higher for firms below the
investment-grade threshold. The evidence suggests that managers have incentives to
modify their credit ratings; however, firms are likely unable to facilitate an increase
based on agencies’ knowledge of such behavior. Using a South Korean sample, Mali
and Lim (2016) show South Korean credit rating agencies differentiate between IG
and NIG samples based on “equal” governance structures. They find IG firms with
higher levels of institutional ownership have higher credit ratings, consistent with
large owners demanding robust governance systems. However, large institutional
ownership is shown to have a negative influence on credit ratings for NIG firms,
potentially due to weaker governance systems and the potential for wealth expropri-
ation. Their results suggest that South Korean credit rating agencies do not consider
IG and NIG firms to be equal.
We believe that relative efficiency has important characteristics for market partici-
pants and may signal financial default to credit rating agencies. To different degrees,
based on credit rating status, firms have the potential to manage earnings in order
to meet financial targets, but relative efficiency, calculated using frontier analysis,
establishes the optimal ratio of the available inputs required in order to generate
sales. Deviations from the optimal efficiency frontier for the IG sample will have an
underlying effect on operational performance. However, the mechanisms by which
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IG and NIG firms influence the efficiency ratio to meet financial targets may be
different. NIG firms may not have developed robust strategic management or gover-
nance systems and may engage in earnings management to meet financial targets or
reduce required expenses that mechanically increase the efficiency ratio, which has
a negative effect on operational performance. Whether or not credit rating agencies
may be sophisticated enough to capture potentially different behavior for NIG and
IG firms is unknown.
2.2 Literature review on firm efficiency
The firm efficiency literature is devoted to finding a relationship between firm effi-
ciency and profitability by using one of two methods: simple accounting ratios or
frontier analysis. Using simple accounting ratios to estimate efficiency, Ou and Pen-
man (1989) find a positive relationship between firm efficiency and future earnings.
Fairfield and Yohn (2001) find evidence that changes in asset turnover are more
persistent in profit margins, thus increasing with firm value. Penman and Zhang
(2002) show that asset turnover is related to current and future earnings changes.
While absolute models are considered appealing due to their relative computational
simplicity, frontier analysis is considered to be a more precise measure. Numerous
studies examine the relationship between firm performance and “relative” efficiency
using frontier analysis. Greene and Segal (2004) demonstrate that firms with higher
operational efficiency than their peers are more profitable, suggesting that firms fur-
ther away from the efficiency frontier horizon are less profitable using ROA and
return on equity (ROE). Cummins and Xie (2008) use DEA in order to examine how
efficiency and productivity influence mergers and acquisitions in the US property-
liability insurance industry. They find a positive association between efficiency and
revenue gains. Baik et al (2013) use DEA and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
to examine the relationship between operational efficiency and changes in current
and future profitability (after adjusting for absolute efficiency). They find evidence
that efficiency change is positively associated with both current and future changes.
Further, they find evidence that these changes are reported in analysts’ forecast revi-
sions. Their model, which includes absolute efficiency and relative efficiency, sug-
gests that relative efficiency has additional explanatory power for empirical modeling
purposes.
Frontier analysis can be performed using two different empirical tests: DEA (a
non-parametric approach) and SFA (a parametric approach). Frontier analysis is con-
sidered more robust than absolute measures for several reasons. First, relative effi-
ciency is estimated as the overall level of outputs divided by inputs for each decision-
making unit (DMU); thus, the most efficient firm within a group of DMUs can be
estimated for each industry and firm year because the DEA vector is industry/year
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Credit Risk
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specific. After estimating the DEA vector for a specific industry within a year, it is
possible to combine the vector with equivalent vectors and years. Second, frontier
analysis considers the optimum level of various inputs required to generate sales;
absolute ratios divide sales by assets or equity. However, the optimum level of expen-
diture and resources required in order to generate sales can never be known using
absolute measures. For example, the salary expense of a professional sports team is
likely much higher than that of a ship manufacturer. Relative efficiency enables the
partitioning of the inputs required to generate output (sales) into two components:
given resources and costs. Costs are made up of expenditures incurred in order to
generate revenue, including advertising, R&D, administration and the cost of goods
sold. Given resources consist of a firm’s equity, including property, plants and equip-
ment, operating lease and goodwill and other intangibles. Using a technique such as
DEA, it is possible to find the level required to achieve optimum efficiency for each
input. Third, while different weightings are applied in order to discover the maxi-
mum efficiency frontier, it is possible to compare all firms within the sample using
an ordinal rank. Further discussion about the advantages of frontier analysis over
absolute measures is provided by Demerjian et al (2012) and Frijns et al (2012).
2.3 Hypotheses
Figure 1 illustrates our hypothesis. The strategic decision making of management
is manifested in operational performance on a daily basis. Firms that achieve maxi-
mum outputs from given inputs are more efficient because of superior decision mak-
ing relative to their peers. Firms have the potential to improve efficiency using two
techniques: operational efficiency and technical efficiency. Firms with robust opera-
tional efficiency are able to achieve greater output by maximizing sales. Firms have
the potential to maximize sales through effective advertising and marketing cam-
paigns, strong products and pricing strategies, and the ability to keep staff motivated,
to predict market trends and to adopt new technologies. A firm can increase techni-
cal efficiency by reducing costs such as research and administration expenses, and
by keeping production levels and labor costs at their optimum; moreover, these firms
are likely to have robust production and procurement systems. It is logical that credit
rating agencies should consider firms that maximize outputs from given inputs less
risky than those with lower relative efficiency.
Consequently, given the association between efficiency, operational performance
and the potential for financial default, we expect to find a positive relationship
between efficiency and credit ratings using DEA. This would suggest that firms with
robust operational performance signal lower future credit risk to credit rating agen-
cies, and this information will be included in a firm’s future credit rating. Moreover,
we expect to find a positive relationship between credit ratings and relative efficiency
Journal of Credit Risk www.risk.net/journals
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after adjusting for absolute efficiency. Based on the above, we develop the following
hypothesis.
(H1) More efficient firms are able to achieve higher credit ratings than their peers in
the subsequent period.
Using our second hypothesis, we aim to discover whether there is a different rela-
tionship between efficiency and credit ratings for NIG and IG firms. NIG firms can
be considered a riskier investment than IG firms (Bolton et al 2012; Opp et al 2013;
Alissa et al 2013). In hypothesis (H1), we consider that efficient firms maximize effi-
ciency through effective strategic management and the ability to generate sales from
given resources, eg, through effective sales generation strategies and the effective uti-
lization of resources. While we do not consider IG and NIG firms to be monolithic,
we hypothesize that the relationship between relative firm efficiency and credit rat-
ings in the subsequent period may be different for IG and NIG because NIG firms
may have less developed corporate systems and potentially less effective strategic
management compared with IG firms.
On the one hand, an IG firm is more likely to maximize its output by keeping
input levels at an optimum. On the other hand, NIG firms have the potential to reduce
important and necessary expenses such as labor, promotional and R&D expenses in
order to meet targets. Given that relative efficiency provides an efficiency frontier
horizon based on all the resources required to generate sales, the optimum levels
of all expenditures and given resources can be estimated. Credit rating agencies are
likely able to identify firms that attempt to meet this target opportunistically. For
example, if there is an established optimum frontier within an industry for expen-
diture on R&D, an NIG firm may reduce its R&D expenditure, creating savings in
order to decrease input and maximize its efficiency score. We predict that credit rat-
ing agencies have the sophistication to consider such behavior a form of distress
rather than robust strategic decision making when undertaken by an NIG firm. Based
on this scenario, credit rating agencies would capture and impose penalties on such
behavior. However, there is also the potential that credit rating agencies are unable
to capture such deviations toward the optimum efficiency frontier horizon and will
reward NIG firms that reduce required expenditures. Based on the above, we develop
the following bidirectional hypothesis.
(H2) The relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings will be different
for NIG and IG firms.
Journal of Credit Risk www.risk.net/journals
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TABLE 1 Credit ratings coding.
CR IG/NIG Grade Definition Moody’s S&P
10 IG Best grade Extremely strong Aaa AAA
9 High grade Very strong Aa1, Aa2 AAC, AA
8 Strong Aa3 AA 
7 Middle grade Good A1, A2 AC, A
6 Medium A3 A 
5 Less vulnerable Baa1, Baa2 BBBC, BBB
4 NIG Low grade More vulnerable Baa3 BBB 
3 Poor grade Currently vulnerable Ba, B, Caa B, C, CCC
2 Highly vulnerable Ca C
1 Extremely vulnerable C D
3 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Variable definition
Our dependent variable is a firm’s credit rating in period t C 1. A firm’s credit rating
is collected from KISVALUE (a Korean database that includes the financial data
of Korean listed firms). Since a rating score of 1 is the highest credit rating score
in the raw data, we subtract each credit rating score from 11 in order to ease the
interpretation of our statistical analysis. As a result, the highest number (10) becomes
the highest credit rating (CR) score, and the lowest number (1) is now the lowest
credit rating score. We conduct ordered probit regression and thus estimate an ordinal
rank for credit rating levels. Table 1 explains our credit rating ordinal ranking, on a
decreasing scale. For example, firms with the highest credit ratings, AAA, are given
an ordinal score of 10. These firms can be considered extremely strong and have
the lowest credit risk. Firms with AAC and AA ratings are given an ordinal rank
of 9 and have slightly higher credit risk from an agency’s perspective. This process
continues for all credit ratings down to the lowest rank, 1. These NIG firms have a
C credit rating by Moody’s and a D credit rating by S&P and are considered to have
the highest credit risk. See Table 1 for further details.
Altman and Rijken (2006) find that the most important consideration for credit
rating agencies is rating stability. Credit ratings are only modified when agencies are
confident that changes in a firm’s risk profile are permanent, a policy known as the
“prudent rating migration” (Hovakimian and Hovakimian 2009; Altman and Rijken
2004; Becker and Milbourn 2011). A credit rating increase can have a long-term
effect on a firm’s excess equity returns; thus, changes should only be made when
there is enough evidence to warrant them. In this study, we examine the relation-
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ship between firm efficiency and credit ratings in period t C 1 because we surmise
that credit rating agencies are forward-looking and have a desire to keep credit rat-
ings relatively consistent. Consequently, operational performance in period t should
influence credit ratings in period t C 1. However, for completeness, in our additional
analyses we repeat all tests using credit ratings in period t .
DEA is a statistical technique used to evaluate relative efficiency for individual
decision-making units. Each DMU has a strategic goal to maximize margins by con-
verting inputs into sales. DEA is similar to other efficiency measures (such as return
on capital employed and ROA) in the sense that it is an estimation of outputs divided
by inputs. However, DEA is different from simple ratio analysis because it provides
an ordinal rank of relative efficiency based on the maximum efficiency frontier hori-
zon (industry and market). The values are based on the various sources of available
inputs required in order to generate sales. Our DEA efficiency measure is estimated
as follows: Ps
iD1 uiyikPm
jD1 vjxjk
; k D 1; : : : ; n: (3.1)
We define output s as sales, and the m inputs are the resources available to the firms
in order to achieve output. We include different inputs x in our study. Each output
is weighted in order to estimate our efficiency score. The weightings in (3.1) are
denoted by u and v for output y and inputs x, respectively. To calculate the DEA
vector,
(i) we group each DMU by firm and industry,
(ii) we vary the weights of u and v to maximize (3.1), which estimates the effi-
ciency frontier horizon (the most efficient combination of input resources
required in order to generate maximum output),
(iii) after establishing the optimal weights, we multiply the weights by their input
and output quantities.
Relative efficiency, REffi;t , is calculated in (3.2): the numerator is sales (output);
the denominator is the input, including the given resources each firm requires in
order to generate sales. Given resources are property, plants and equipment, operat-
ing lease, goodwill and other intangibles. Costs are the expenditures required in order
to generate revenue, including advertising, R&D, administration expenses and cost of
goods sold. A value of 1 represents the efficiency frontier, to enable an ordinal rank-
ing. A score of 1 is consequently considered the most efficient (10 output/10 input,
given a maximum efficiency score of 10). A firm with an ordinal efficiency score
of 0.5 (5 output/10 input) is considered to have greater efficiency than one with 0.4
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(4 output/10 input). This model allows us to compare first the most efficient combi-
nation of input resources for each industry and then each firm’s efficiency score with
the market as a whole.
Relative efficiency (using DEA) is defined as
max
u
 D u1 sales
u1GRC u2 costs ; (3.2)
where “sales” (output) denotes gross sales; given resources (GR) is equal to PPE
plus operating lease plus goodwill and other intangibles; “costs” denotes the cost of
goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A); PPE denotes
net property, plant and equipment; “operating lease” denotes net operating lease; and
“goodwill” denotes purchased goodwill.
Equation (3.3) below is our main model of interest. Due to the discrete and ordered
nature of our dependent variable – credit ratings (from 1 to 10) – ordinary least
squares regression would be an inappropriate model. We therefore borrow from
Blume et al (1998) and Amato and Furfine (2004) by running ordered probit regres-
sion analysis. We defineRi;tC1 to be the credit rating category of firm i in year tC1,
and Xi;t to be the vector of observable variables available at time t that influence the
determination of the credit rating (CR) of firm i . Ri;tC1.CRtC1/ is continuous and
its range is the set of real numbers (see Table 3(b)).
We then consider an unobservable variable
Ri;tC1 D ˇXi;t C "i;t
determined by Xi;t , where ˇ is the vector of slope coefficients of our explanatory
variables. The random variable "i;t is a normally distributed unobserved error term;
the parameters i define the partitions of the range of Ri;tC1 associated with each
value of a rating:
Ri;t D
8ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆ<ˆ
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ:
1 if Ri;tC1 6 1;
2 if 1 < Ri;tC1 < 2;
3 if 2 < Ri;tC1 < 3;
:::
10 if 9 < Ri;tC1:
We detect the influence of relative efficiency on credit ratings by calculating the
marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of ratings changes.
We believe firms with the ability to make effective decisions to transform resources
into sales are more likely to achieve higher credit ratings in the subsequent period.
Thus, we expect to find a positive relationship between firm efficiency and credit
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Credit Risk
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TABLE 2 Model selection process. [Table continues on next page.]
(a) Selection of proxies
Key determinants of CR Proxies
Firm performance, value EPS, CFO, Tobin’s Q, CPS, ROA, ROS, ROE
Size Market size, investment grade
Lev Total liabilities/total assets
Total liabilities/total owners’ equity
Loss Negative NI, negative OI
Market risk Market volatility, Beta
Accrual-based earnings DAMJ (from modified Jones modes, 1995)
management DAKO (from performance adjusted model, 2005)
ABMJ (absolute value of DAMJ)
ABKO (absolute value of DAKO)
Real earnings management TRM (real earnings management measures)
Ownership structure Biggest owners’ shareholdings
Monitoring Foreign investor
Institutional investors
ratings in period t C 1. The ordered probit model is specified as follows (see also
Table 2):
Ri;tC1 D ˇ1REffi;t C ˇ2AEffi;t C ˇ3CFOi;t C ˇ4TQi;t
C ˇ5Levi;t C ˇ6lossi;t C ˇ7voli;t C ˇ8AEMi;t
C ˇ9REMi;t C ˇ10BigOwni;t C ˇ11Fori;t C ˇ12Kospii;t
C IDC YDC "i;t : (3.3)
For our control variables, we go through a four-step procedure.
(1) We identify the following five key determinant categories of credit ratings
based on the previous literature:
(a) Korean Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) and firm performance,
(b) business risk,
(c) earnings management,
(d) governance structure,
(e) industry and year fixed effects.
Journal of Credit Risk www.risk.net/journals
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TABLE 2 Continued.
(b) Variable definitions
Variable Sign Definition
Dependent variable:
CRtC1 Credit ratings at time t C 1
Variables of interest:
Relative efficiency C Technical efficiency score computed using
data envelopment analysis
Absolute efficiency C Overall efficiency computed by dividing total
sales revenue by total assets
Control variables:
1. Market size and
firm performance
Kospi C Market size: takes a value of 1 if a firm is listed
on KOSPI; 0 if listed on KOSDAQ
Cash performance C CFO (cashflow from operation/total assets)
Market-based performance C Earnings per share
Firm value C Tobin’s Q calculated using Chung and Pruitt
(1994)
2. Business risk
Indebtedness   Debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets)
Loss   A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a
firm’s net income is negative; 0 otherwise
Market risk C ln.standard deviation of yearly stock return p
trading days/
3. Earnings management
AEM   Absolute value of discretionary accruals
suggested by Dechow et al (1995)
REM   AbCFO. 1/C AbProdC AbSGA. 1/
suggested by Roychowdhury (2006)
4. Governance structure
BigOwn ? Biggest shareholder’s share holdings (%)
For C Foreign investors’ share holdings (%)
5. Fixed effect
ID Industry fixed effect
YD Year fixed effect
Boldface denotes proxies included in our model.
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(2) Under each category, we identify a median classification level, for exam-
ple, we divide firm performance into (a) financial performance, (b) market
performance and (c) value performance.
(3) We identify what proxies are available for each median level category. For
example, under financial performance, the proxies available include: earnings
per share; return on assets; return on sales; and return on equity (see Table 2).
(4) Finally, in order to examine the incremental effect of relative efficiency on
credit ratings, we select the final control variable for each category that best
explains our dependent variable credit ratings.
Generally, researchers select variables based on determinants without testing the
validity of the proxies. However, we perform an additional step (using scatter plots
and correlations) in order to select the variable that best represents each determinant
category. For example, earnings per share (EPS) is generally more highly correlated
with credit ratings than ROA, ROE, cash per share (CPS), etc. For robustness, we
conduct our analyses after replacing our current variables with other alternatives and
find that the results remain qualitatively unchanged. Note that we do not rely solely
on scatter plots and correlations when choosing variables; however, we use these
techniques at the final stage in order to select the variable that best represents each
key determinant category. All the proxies considered as determinants are shown in
Table 2(a). The proxies in boldface have been included in our model. The purpose of
these additional steps is to develop the model with the highest explanatory power.
In Table 2(b), we show the expected relationship between credit ratings in period
t C 1 and our control variables selected as proxies for our determinants. In our
online appendixes, we provide additional information about variable estimation.
CFO denotes cash performance calculated as the cashflow from operation divided
by total assets. We expect a positive association between CR and CFO because cash-
rich firms are less likely to have liquidity problems. EPS (market performance) is
calculated as earnings per share divided by 1000 won for standardization. We expect
EPS to be positive because firms with higher net incomes are less likely to have
default risk than firms with lower net income. Lev (indebtedness) is calculated as
total liabilities/total assets. We expect Lev to be negative because firms with more
liabilities than assets are unlikely to adapt to financial shocks. Loss is a dummy vari-
able that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s net income is negative; Loss is expected to be
negative. Vol (market risk) is calculated as the natural log of the standard deviation
of the yearly stock return times the square root of the number of trading days. We
expect Vol to be negative, consistent with market risk and credit risk being linked
(Lim and Mali 2018). Tobin’s Q (firm value) is calculated using
TQ D MVCSCMVPSC STL   STAC LTDC INV
TA
; (3.4)
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where TQ denotes Tobin’s Q, MVCS is the market value of common stock, MVPS
is the market value of preferred stock, STL denotes short-term (current) liabilities,
STA denotes short-term (current) assets, LTD denotes long-term debt, INV denotes
inventory and TA denotes the total assets.
We expect to find a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and CR. Accruals
earnings management (AEM) is calculated as the absolute value of discretionary
accruals suggested by Dechow et al (1995). AEM represents a managerial strategy
to increase earnings by modifying accounting treatments. We expect it to have a neg-
ative relationship with credit ratings. Managers can also influence earnings through
real earnings management (REM). Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence suggesting
that managers make operational decisions in order to temporarily increase earnings
by doing the following.
(1) Offering large discounts to customers to increase sales, called abnormal level
of cashflow from operations (AbCFO): this increases sales, but overall the
process has a negative effect on profit margins.
(2) Abnormal overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, called abnor-
mal level of production costs (AbProd): increasing production levels reduces
production overheads and increases overall net income, but the process can
increase obsolesce and storage costs.
(3) Abnormal reductions in discretionary expenses, called abnormal level of sales
and general administrative expenses (AbSGA): discretionary expenses include
various intangible assets not included on financial statements, including brand
value and human capital. Reductions in SG&A are considered real earn-
ings manipulation because they are required for robust day-to-day business
operations.
Scrutiny by regulators is weaker for REM compared with AEM because it is diffi-
cult for legislators to detect opportunistic real earnings manipulation; thus, the cost of
REM is lower. Therefore, we consider that REM would be a more desirable method
for managers to influence credit ratings if they were inclined to do so. Real earn-
ings management (REM) is calculated in the models AbCFO. 1/ C AbProd C
AbSGA. 1/ as suggested by Roychowdhury (2006) and modified by Cohen and
Zarowin (2010). We expect a negative relationship between REM and credit ratings
because REM is considered an opportunistic deviation from normal business prac-
tices. We also consider that NIG firms demonstrate higher levels of earnings man-
agement than IG firms, suggesting that IG firms demonstrate more robust strategic
management and lower levels of opportunism than NIG firms (refer to Appendix A
online for earnings management definitions).
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Credit Risk
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BigOwn (governance) is the largest shareholder’s share holdings calculated as a
percentage, and can be positive or negative. A negative relationship would suggest
large owners expropriate wealth opportunistically. A positive result would suggest
large owners provide guidance and are able to break disputes between shareholders.
For (governance) is calculated as foreign investors’ share holdings as a percentage.
For is expected to be positive because foreign investors are likely to demand stronger
corporate governance. Kospi is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is
listed on the KOSPI stock exchange and a value of 0 if the firm is listed on the
Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) stock exchange (see
the online appendix); the KOSPI exchange is larger than KOSDAQ. Kospi has the
potential to be positive or negative because we would expect larger firms to benefit
from economies of scale; however, larger firms may simply have weaker internal
systems and a greater potential for default. Finally, we add year and industry fixed-
effect dummies.
3.2 Sample
All our data was collected from the Total Solution 2000 (TS2000), DataGuide and
KISVALUE databases. These databases are similar to the WRDS package in the
US and ORBIS in Europe and are analytical database programs provided by Korean
Companies Information (KOCOinfor). FNguide is provided by National Information
and Credit Evaluation (NICE). All three data aggregators provide financial, nonfinan-
cial and other data for professional analysts and academics. See Appendix A online
for additional information.
The sample selection process is shown in Table 3(a). We initially downloaded
23 648 nonfinancial firm observations from between 2000 and 2015. Financial firms
were not initially considered for this study because the nature of their business is
likely different from that of nonfinancial firms. More specifically, the inputs and
outputs to calculate relative efficiency scores, the key determinants of credit ratings
and the level of regulator supervision for financial firms are likely to be different from
those for nonfinancial firms. Further, key financial variables were used to calculate
our main control variables, such as absolute value of discretionary accruals; REM
proxies are not available for financial firms.
Next, we excluded 8448 observations for firms with insufficient data to calculate
efficiency scores. We excluded an additional 529 observations for firms without all
the relevant financial data required to complete the analysis, leaving a final sample of
14 270. In Table 3(b), we show the number of observations per ordinal rank credit rat-
ing (as given in Table 2). As expected, credit ratings are distributed in a bell-shaped
curve, with the highest number of observations (3137) being for medium-risk firms.
Overall, we found there were 8666 IG firms and 6054 NIG firms. Table 3(c) shows
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TABLE 3 Sample selection.
(a) Firm efficiency and credit rating sample 2000–2015
Initial CR sample 23 648
Excluding firms with insufficient observations to compute FE scores (8 448)
Potential sample 15 200
Excluding firms with no financial data available (480)
Final sample 14 720
(b) Sample selection by credit rating
IG NIG‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
CR CR
scores Definition Obs. scores Definition Obs.
10 Extremely strong 127 5 Less vulnerable 2 576
9 Very strong 1 311 4 More vulnerable 1 757
8 Strong 1 716 3 Currently vulnerable 1 081
7 Good 2 375 2 Highly vulnerable 443
6 Medium 3 137 1 Extremely vulnerable 197
Total 8 666 Total 6 054
(c) Sample selection by year
Mean Mean
Year Obs. efficiency Year Obs. efficiency
2000 920 0.53 2008 920 0.69
2001 920 0.56 2009 920 0.60
2002 920 0.49 2010 920 0.77
2003 920 0.63 2011 920 0.73
2004 920 0.57 2012 920 0.73
2005 920 0.46 2013 920 0.75
2006 920 0.54 2014 920 0.77
2007 920 0.57 2015 920 0.77
the levels of relative mean efficiency by firm year. Firm efficiency was 0.53 in 2000,
increasing to 0.77 in 2015. We speculate that this is because of the accumulation of
corporate knowledge, technological developments and market forces.
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Univariate analysis
In Table 4, we provide information about the mean/median levels of our full, IG and
NIG samples, and in the final column we give the results of mean/median difference
tests comparing the IG and NIG samples. As we expect, we find that relative effi-
ciency is lower for NIG than IG firms, with results that are statistically significant
at the 1% significance level (t -value 7.63). We also find that absolute efficiency is
different for IG firms and NIG firms (t -value 5.84). The results are consistent with
IG firms demonstrating superior operational performance to NIG firms, suggesting
that IG firms are able to generate more output from given inputs than NIG firms. The
remainder of mean difference tests comparing the control variables of the IG and
NIG firms show expected results: IG firms have higher cashflows (t -value 47.59),
EPS (t -value, 32.18), Tobin’s Q (t -value 29.62), large shareholders (t -value 12.15)
and foreign ownership (t -value 22.69), and lower leverage (t -value  96:30), losses
(t -value  62:48), volatility (t -value  29:70), accruals (t -value  20:74) and REM
(t -value  16:40). While economies of scale have the potential to influence credit
ratings, we find that, in a Korean context, listing on the KOSPI stock exchange com-
pared with the KOSDAQ does not have a statistically significant influence on credit
ratings. Note that the levels of earnings management for NIG firms are higher than
those of IG firms. Our results suggest that distressed NIG firms are more likely to
improve their efficiency levels opportunistically using earnings management.
In Table 5, we give the results of Pearson correlations. We find that credit ratings in
period tC1 have a positive relationship with relative efficiency at the 1% significance
level. This suggests relative efficiency may have additional explanatory power in
explaining the relationship between efficiency and credit ratings in period t C 1. We
find the relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings is consistent when
we use absolute efficiency. These results suggest that credit ratings increase with
efficiency. All control variables show the expected sign and are consistent with our
mean difference tests.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
We perform ordered probit regression in Table 6 in order to test hypothesis (H1).
Model 1 shows that firms that are more efficient in turning resources into sales than
their peers demonstrate higher credit ratings in the subsequent period (coefficient
0.15, z-value 5.21). In model 2, we regress absolute efficiency with credit ratings in
period t C 1.1 Overall, we find model 2 gives similar results to model 1: a positive
1 For robustness, we redefine absolute efficiency as ROTA (ie, EBIT divided by total assets) and
repeat all the analyses. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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TABLE 5 Pearson correlations.
CR REff AEff CFO EPS TQ Lev
CR 1
REff 0.10 1
AEff 0.03 0.12 1
CFO 0.42 0.11 0.18 1
EPS 0.31 0.03 0.06 0.21 1
TQ 0.31 0.08  0.10 0.09 0.06 1
Lev  0.75  0.03 0.23  0.14  0.12  0.38 1
Loss  0.53  0.09  0.17  0.35  0.32  0.02 0.22
Vol  0.30  0.11  0.02  0.20  0.18  0.02 0.18
AEM  0.22  0.01 0.04  0.13  0.08 0.05 0.15
REM  0.16 0.01  0.17  0.41 0.01 0.03  0.00
BigOwn 0.11  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.01  0.18  0.08
For 0.22  0.00  0.04 0.13 0.03 0.20  0.14
Kospi 0.00  0.10  0.03 0.03 0.19  0.21 0.10
Loss Vol AEM REM BigOwn For Kospi
Loss 1
Vol 0.23 1
AEM 0.22 0.31 1
REM 0.16 0.13 0.12 1
BigOwn  0.12  0.14  0.12  0.06 1
For  0.11  0.23  0.09 0.02 0.03 1
Kospi  0.08  0.24  0.17  0.03 0.02 0.21 1
,  and  denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. See Table 2
for the definitions of the variables.
relationship between absolute efficiency and CR (coefficient 0.44, z-value 24.16).
In model 3, we find a positive relationship between CR in period t C 1 and relative
efficiency after adjusting for absolute efficiency (coefficient 0.07, z-value 2.66). We
find evidence consistent with (H1): there is a positive relationship between relative
efficiency and credit ratings in the subsequent year. In addition, our findings add to
the current debate about whether relative efficiency calculated using frontier analysis
has additional explanatory power. We find that, after adjusting for absolute efficiency,
relative efficiency has incremental explanatory power in explaining the relationship
between relative firm efficiency and credit ratings.
The results are consistent with credit rating agencies having the sophistication
to interpret a firm’s ability to generate sales from given resources. The positive
association between relative efficiency and credit ratings suggests a negative rela-
tionship between relative operational performance and potential default risk from
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TABLE 6 Influence of firm efficiency on credit ratings using efficiency score: results of
ordered probit regression analysis.
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
REff C 0.15 0.07
(5.21) (2.66)
AEff C 0.45 0.44
(24.60) (24.16)
CFO C 0.429 4.16 4.13
(34.50) (33.41) (33.07)
EPS C 0.03 0.03 0.03
(12.96) (12.65) (12.72)
Tobin Q C 0.17 0.18 0.18
(6.17) (6.59) (6.46)
Lev    6.86  7.41  7.41
( 96.56) ( 98.19) ( 98.12)
Loss    1.40  1.35  1.35
( 51.27) ( 49.27) ( 49.04)
Vol    0.00  0.00  0.01
( 9.71) ( 9.97) ( 9.51)
AEM    0.58  0.79  0.79
( 4.75) ( 6.44) ( 6.43)
REM    0.32  0.19  0.20
( 7.30) ( 4.43) ( 4.64)
BigOwn ? 0.30 0.23 0.24
(6.06) (4.64) (4.79)
For C 0.99 1.03 1.03
(11.14) (11.55) (11.49)
Kospi ? 0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.21) (1.46) (1.69)
YD Included Included Included
ID Included Included Included
2 19 040.21 19 663.74 19 623.84
Pseudo R2 0.3578 0.3691 0.3689
Obs. 13 075 13 090 13 074
,  and  denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Figures in
parentheses indicate z-values. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Model:
CRi;tC1 D ˇ1REffi;t C ˇ2AEffi;t C ˇ3CFOi;t C ˇ4TQi;t C ˇ5Levi;t C ˇ6Lossi;t
C ˇ7Voli;t C ˇ8AEMi;t C ˇ9REMi;t C ˇ10BigOwni;t C ˇ11Fori;t C ˇ12Kospii;t C IDC YDC "i;t :
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the credit rating agency’s perspective. Management makes strategic decisions in
order to maximize sales from available resources to optimize efficiency. A firm may
increase efficiency by increasing sales though effective advertising, marketing and
promotional activities, the ability to understand customers and market trends, and
the ability to adopt enhanced systems and technologies. Moreover, managers can
increase efficiency by utilizing resources and by optimizing R&D, administration
costs and human capital costs. Further, effective firms are likely to optimize effi-
ciency with robust production and operational systems that minimize waste. Our
data suggests that relative efficiency is a potential signal of a firm’s effective strate-
gic decision making relative to their peers, which is captured by a firm’s credit rat-
ings.2 Consistent with our univariate tests and Pearson correlations, all of our control
variables apart from Kospi demonstrate the expected sign at the 1% significance
level.
5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Decile rank of relative efficiency
For robustness, we perform ordered probit regression using the decile rank of rela-
tive efficiency, using efficiency scores from 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest level
of efficiency, or the efficiency closest to the maximum efficiency frontier. Model 1 in
Table 2 shows that relative efficiency is associated with credit ratings when we use
the decile rank of efficiency scores (coefficient 0.07, z-value 19.85). In model 2, we
find that relative efficiency has incremental explanatory power to explain the rela-
tionship between credit ratings and efficiency after adjusting for absolute efficiency
(coefficient 0.05, z-value 13.66). Taken together, the results from Tables 6 and 7
suggest that relative efficiency could be included as a key determinant when estimat-
ing credit ratings, and that relative efficiency may influence a credit rating agency’s
perception of credit risk.
5.2 IG versus NIG
In (5.1), we add the dummy variable IG, which takes a value of 1 if a firm is above the
investment-grade threshold (A  and above) and 0 if a firm is below the IG threshold
2 Due to market forces, relative efficiency may not be consistent over time, owing to the accumula-
tion of corporate knowledge and technological developments. For robustness, we cross-sectionally
estimate relative efficiency for each year in the data set and examine the relationship between
credit ratings in period tC1 and relative efficiency for each year in the data set using the technique
suggested by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Tabulated results are consistent with previous findings.
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TABLE 7 Influence of firm efficiency on credit ratings using decile rank.
Sign Model 1 Model 2
REff decile C 0.07 0.05
(19.85) (13.66)
AEff C 0.38
(19.94)
CFO C 4.10 4.01
(32.83) (32.04)
EPS C 0.03 0.03
(12.91) (12.72)
Tobin Q C 0.14 0.16
(5.23) (5.70)
Lev    6.93  7.38
( 96.99) ( 97.55)
Loss    1.28  1.27
( 45.78) ( 45.24)
Vol    0.00  0.00
( 9.91) ( 9.61)
AEM    0.72  0.86
( 5.88) ( 7.00)
REM    0.27  0.19
( 6.31) ( 4.39)
BigOwn ? 0.27 0.23
(5.45) (4.57)
For C 0.94 0.98
(10.50) (11.01)
Kospi ? 0.02 0.04
(0.83) (2.01)
YD Included Included
ID Included Included
2 19 408.20 19 803.60
Pseudo R2 0.3648 0.3722
Obs. 13 075 13 074
,  and  denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Figures in
parentheses indicate z-values. REff decile denotes the decile rank of relative efficiency score from 1 to 10, where
10 is the highest. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Model:
CRi;tC1 D ˇ1REff decilei;t C ˇ2AEffi;t C ˇ3CFOi;t C ˇ4TQi;t C ˇ5Levi;t C ˇ6Lossi;t
C ˇ7Voli;t C ˇ8AEMi;t C ˇ9REMi;t C ˇ10BigOwni;t C ˇ11Fori;t C ˇ12Kospii;t C IDC YDC "i;t :
Journal of Credit Risk www.risk.net/journals
The influence of firm efficiency on agency credit ratings 27
TABLE 8 Comparative analysis of investment-grade versus non-investment-grade firms.
Sign Model 1 Model 2
REff C 0.08 0.07
(4.17) (2.22)
IG C 1.40 1.24
(69.25) (38.21)
REffIG C 0.26
(6.32)
AEff C 0.24 0.24
(18.39) (18.51)
CFO C 2.39 2.38
(26.94) (26.87)
EPS C 0.02 0.02
(11.02) (11.03)
Tobin Q C 0.12 0.12
(6.29) (6.15)
Lev    4.33  4.33
( 89.99) ( 90.01)
Loss    0.75  0.75
( 39.29) ( 39.39)
Vol    0.00  0.00
( 8.24) ( 8.44)
AEM    0.58  0.59
( 6.61) ( 6.80)
REM    0.12  0.12
( 3.80) ( 3.83)
BigOwn ? 0.11 0.12
(3.09) (3.21)
For C 0.62 0.62
(9.68) (9.71)
Kospi ? 0.02 0.02
(1.41) (1.46)
YD Included Included
ID Included Included
2 26891.45 26932,70
Pseudo R2 0.5055 0.5062
Obs. 13 074 13 074
,  and  denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Figures in
parentheses indicate z-values. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Model:
CRi;tC1 D ˇ1REffi;t C ˇ2IGi;t C ˇ3REffIGi;t C ˇ4AEffi;t C ˇ5CFOi;t
C ˇ6TQi;t C ˇ7Levi;t C ˇ8Lossi;t C ˇ9Voli;t C ˇ10AEMi;t C ˇ11REMi;t C ˇ12BigOwni;t
C ˇ13Fori;t C ˇ14Kospii;t C IDC YDC "i;t :
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(BBB+ and below):
Ri;tC1 D ˇ1REffi;t C ˇ2IGi;t C ˇ3REffIGi;t C ˇ4AEffi;t C ˇ5CFOi;t
C ˇ6TQi;t C ˇ7Levi;t C ˇ8Lossi;t C ˇ9Voli;t C ˇ10AEMi;t
C ˇ11REMi;t C ˇ12BigOwni;t C ˇ13Fori;t C ˇ14Sizei;t
C IDC YDC "i;t : (5.1)
Our variable of interest is the interaction term REffIGi;t , which shows a different
relationship between firm efficiency and credit rating in period tC1 for both NIG and
IG samples. In model 1 in Table 8, we again find that, after controlling for absolute
efficiency, relative efficiency has explanatory power to explain the overall relation-
ship between credit ratings and operational efficiency. However, in model 2, when we
interact relative efficiency with our IG dummy, we find that the relationship between
efficiency and credit ratings is stronger for IG firms.
The IG firms at the optimum efficiency frontier demonstrate the best corporate per-
formance and most robust systems. Consequently, in hypothesis (H2), we consider
whether the relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings is equal or dif-
ferent for NIG and IG. On the one hand, NIG firms may be rewarded for minimizing
expenditure on resources. On the other hand, credit rating agencies may consider
NIG firms less likely to have the ability to maximize sales than IG groups. Thus,
higher efficiency could be seen as an opportunistic form of earnings management
by the firm in order to meet financial targets to position themselves closer to the
efficiency frontier horizon.
Our results suggest that NIG firms with higher relative efficiency are more likely
to achieve a lower credit rating in the subsequent period, suggesting they are more
likely to be perceived as having an increased potential to default by rating agencies.
We speculate that the different relationships between relative efficiency and credit
ratings for the NIG and IG samples may be due to NIG firms being required to sacri-
fice expenditure on resources in order to meet targets to move closer to the optimum
efficiency frontier (as suggested by the negative relationship between credit ratings
and accruals and REM). NIG managers may manipulate input by reducing neces-
sary expenditures (including advertising and R&D) and downsizing the workforce;
as a result, credit rating agencies may capture this behavior and impose penalties
accordingly.
5.3 Independent IG/ING analysis
Next, we perform ordered probit regression independently for 7591 NIG and 5483 IG
observations, respectively. Model 3 in Table 9 shows that, after controlling for abso-
lute efficiency, relative efficiency has incremental explanatory power in our ordered
Journal of Credit Risk www.risk.net/journals
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probit regression for both NIG and IG samples. Interestingly, there is a different
directional relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings in period t C 1
for the NIG and IG samples. We consistently find a positive relationship between rel-
ative efficiency and credit ratings in period tC1 for the IG sample. However, we find
a negative relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings for NIG firms
(coefficient 0.11, z-value 2.08). While we expected to find a different relationship
between firm efficiency and credit ratings, a negative relationship between firm effi-
ciency and subsequent credit ratings provides additional explanatory power.3 Again,
we surmise this result may be because NIG firms have the potential for inferior man-
agement and less robust operational systems. Thus, to satisfy stakeholders, NIG firms
may make short-term decisions in order to manage operational performance, which
may have a negative influence on future credit ratings, because the results suggest
credit rating agencies have the sophistication to interpret a firm’s relative efficiency
differently for NIG and IG firms.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
We estimate the investment-grade group as being above BBBC, an ordinal rank of
5 or higher (see our ordinal rankings in Table 1). However, different investors have
different risk criteria. Thus, we perform sensitivity analysis in order to redefine the
investment-grade threshold in seven different ways: we developed seven separate
models, in which each investment grade was defined differently. Table 10 provides
the results of our analysis (we only include the coefficient and significance level
for credit ratings in period t C 1, for brevity) and lists our redefined IG samples:
investment grade column IG6 lists our redefined IG sample set at an original score
of 6 (IG was defined as 5 in our main analysis). Thus, non-investment-grade IG6 also
increases the ordinal score of our NIG sample to 5 (NIG was defined as 4 in our main
analysis). We repeat this process for various IG/NIG ordinal scores (see the notes
in Table 10). Table 10 provides evidence that relative firm efficiency is positively
associated with credit ratings in the subsequent period for our new IG/NIG status,
indicating that relative efficiency has useful information in predicting future credit
ratings for our modified investment-grade sample. Moreover, we also find a negative
relationship for the NIG sample. Both results are consistent with our main findings.
3 For robustness, we repeated our analyses using SFA based on the Malmquist efficiency index
calculation technique (see Coelli et al 2005). Our results suggest that overall there is a positive
relationship between credit ratings in period tC1 and firm efficiency. Moreover, there are different
relationships between firm efficiency and subsequent credit ratings for riskier NIG firms and less
risky IG firms.
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5.5 Credit rating at time t
We used credit ratings at time t C 1 as the dependent variable for all of the analyses
in our study, because rating agencies use annual financial statement data in order to
measure a firm’s credit rating and are forward-looking. However, it is also possible
that the influence of current efficiency on future default probability should be cap-
tured in period t . To add robustness, we conducted additional analysis after replacing
credit ratings one period ahead (t C 1) with contemporaneous ones (t ). Our results
(untabulated) suggest these are consistent.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We performed empirical tests to establish whether relative efficiency calculated using
frontier analysis (ie, DEA) has the potential to explain the relationship between effi-
ciency and credit ratings. We consider relative efficiency to be the manifestation
of a firm’s operational performance, as a direct result of strategic decision making.
Consequently, we questioned whether or not operational performance, proxied by
relative efficiency, influences a credit rating agency’s potential of risk, proxied by
credit ratings. Our results suggest that, after adjusting for absolute efficiency, rela-
tive efficiency has a positive relationship with credit ratings in period t C 1. These
results suggest that firms with the most effective management strategies to improve
technical efficiency and operational efficiency likely have higher credit ratings in
the subsequent period and demonstrate that credit rating agencies are sophisticated
enough to capture the ability of firms to generate sales (output) by utilizing limited
resources (input) and capture this information in a firm’s credit rating in period tC1.
Our results are consistent when we test the relationship between relative efficiency
and credit ratings in period t . The role of credit agencies is to provide market partic-
ipants with information about whether a firm will likely survive through the business
cycle. Our results are consistent with credit rating agencies judging that firms that
are more efficient are more likely to withstand stressful macroeconomic conditions.
When we partition our sample into IG and NIG, we find different results. The rela-
tionship between relative efficiency and credit ratings remains positive for IG firms
and the full sample; however, the relationship between firm efficiency and credit rat-
ings is negative for the NIG sample. NIG firms may minimize required inputs in
order to meet financial targets. For example, given that frontier analysis establishes
an optimum efficiency frontier within an industry, an NIG firm may reduce its expen-
diture on required expenses, such as R&D, in order to maximize its efficiency ratio.
Consequently, NIG firms have the potential to move closer to the optimal efficiency
frontier horizon. However, this position could be considered differently for both sam-
ples. We conjecture that movement toward the optimal efficiency frontier for the IG
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sample is a demonstration of effective operational performance and strategic man-
agement. However, it has the potential to be viewed as weak operational performance
as a result of economic distress for the NIG sample, and penalties may be imposed
on such behavior.
The results of this study are important for numerous reasons. First, we find that rel-
ative efficiency has a positive influence on credit ratings for the IG sample as well as
our full sample. This finding could have important implications: relative efficiency is
a proxy for operational performance. Higher operational performance demonstrates
that management is effective. We find evidence that credit rating agencies are able to
capture this information and include it in their credit rating. Rating agencies are inter-
ested in whether a firm is likely to survive through the business cycle, and judge that
an efficient firm is more likely to withstand difficult economic conditions. Second,
there is a growing interest as to whether relative efficiency has implicit advantages
compared with absolute efficiency for modeling purposes. We find evidence that rel-
ative efficiency and absolute efficiency can be used in our model, suggesting both
measures provide relevant information for modeling purposes. Finally, we find that
the relationship between relative efficiency and credit ratings is different for NIG
and IG samples. We surmise that the differences are potentially due to movements
toward the efficiency frontier representing financial distress or a form of opportunism
to meet financial targets at the expense of robust operational performance for the NIG
sample. Future studies may extend our findings and consider the opportunistic mech-
anism that facilitates the different relationships between relative efficiency and credit
ratings for investment-grade and non-investment-grade firms.
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